VAN AIR Europe

Regional aircraft are built to last decades. The airframes are designed for 30, 40, sometimes 50 years of service. The support ecosystem around them is not designed on the same timeline. Parts become scarce, approvals slow, and the manufacturer's attention moves to newer models. The aircraft is still airworthy. The system that keeps it flying is not.

Jan Václavík sees that gap from the operator's seat. He is managing director of Aeroservis, a Czech company based at Brno-Tuřany Airport that provides maintenance, engineering, and certification work for regional aircraft. The associated airline, VAN AIR Europe, operates the Let L-410, a type with about 1,200 built and roughly 93 still in service with militaries worldwide in 2026. The airframes are holding up. The parts are not.

Václavík describes a specific example. Aeroservis obtained a supplemental type certificate to replace the L-410 main landing gear rear hinge because, in the company's own words, "original spare parts are not generally and readily available in the market and the lead time offered by the original manufacturer is prohibitively long." The solution was not to wait. It was to engineer an alternative and certify it.

That is the pattern he describes across the fleet. When a part is unavailable, the operator has three options. Ground the aircraft, cannibalise another airframe, or develop an alternative. The first two are expensive. The third requires engineering capability, certification knowledge, and the willingness to invest in a solution the manufacturer should have provided. "If the target audience is other operators, then definitely this should be highlighted," he says. The audience that needs to hear it is the one currently absorbing the cost.

The problem is not confined to older types. IATA reported in June 2026 that engine MRO bottlenecks, spare parts shortages, and constrained aftermarket access are disrupting airline operations, with 648 Pratt & Whitney GTF-powered aircraft grounded at the peak in March 2025, 28% of the fleet. Willie Walsh, IATA's Director General, was direct about the cause. He said, "Airlines need better access to spare parts, more approved repair options, fair access to MRO capacity and greater competition in the aftermarket."

The same organisation identified the mechanism. In a June 2026 speech, IATA's Director of Flight Operations described how access to parts and repairs is restricted "by control over repair instructions, tooling, approved repair networks, or spares distribution," and that "commercial licensing practices make it harder for airlines to use safe, certified alternatives". The result is fewer choices, longer waits, and higher costs. The aircraft is not the constraint. The commercial architecture around it is.

The regional segment feels this more sharply than the large commercial fleet. Aviation Week reported in April 2026 that MHIRJ, the aftermarket support provider for Bombardier regional jets, has begun manufacturing parts itself because "the supply chain [has gaps]." It can now produce some 7,000 parts, focused on structural components, and is actively sourcing parts for operators who cannot get them elsewhere. When the support provider becomes the manufacturer because the manufacturer cannot supply, the gap is no longer theoretical.

The consequences travel further than the operator and reach the cabin. Václavík describes three areas where the aircraft has not kept pace with what passengers expect. The air conditioning system, he says, is not powerful enough for hot climates, and no operator flying the type has solved it. The original seat design dates back decades and offers less space than modern travelers expect. New slimline seats are being certified to address that. Engine performance matters too, not only for safety margins but for payload. At hot, high-altitude airports, a more powerful engine allows the aircraft to carry more passengers rather than offload them. "We are focused really on creating our advantage," he says. Comfort, convenience, and safety are not separate problems. They are the same aftermarket gap, experienced from the passenger seat.

Václavík's position is not that manufacturers should be forced to support every aircraft forever. It is that the support ecosystem needs to be more open, more competitive, and more transparent. The engineering capability exists. The certification pathways exist. What is missing is the commercial willingness to let independent providers use them.

The aircraft will outlast the support system unless the system changes. A regional operator buying a 30-year asset needs to know that parts will be available in year 15, not just year three. If the answer is no, the asset is worth less than the spreadsheet says, and the passengers who depend on it are flying on borrowed time. The airframe is not the problem. The question is who is still willing to support it.