A used car dealership in Maryland.
A used car dealership in Laurel, Maryland. Jim Watson/AFP

KEY POINTS

  • Cart-Mart generated more cash from customers than ever, yet became less able to make new loans because of its financing structure.
  • Post-pandemic rate hikes and rigid securitization structures forced revenues from customers to go straight to bondholders.
  • Car-Mart's breakdown signals broader trouble ahead as over $1 trillion in high-yield corporate debt matures through 2027.

For more than four decades, millions of cash-strapped Americans turned to America's Car-Mart Inc. for used vehicles and financing.

Now it is Car-Mart that is strapped for cash, squeezed by a combination of higher interest rates and Wall Street financial engineering that once fueled—but now chokes—growth.

Car-Mart closed 60 of its 154 dealerships during fiscal 2026, the Auto Wire noted, warning investors of "substantial doubt" about its ability to stay open amid a 27.1% decline in vehicle sales during its fourth quarter. However, company disclosures indicate that this drop was driven less by an unfavorable business climate than by a deliberate pullback in inventory purchases and loan originations as management sought to preserve cash on hand.

Car-Mart's difficulties are rooted in the post-pandemic macroeconomic shift from near-zero interest rates to frequent and aggressive rate hikes as central banks fought to contain rising inflation. Lower-income households were hit hardest by rising prices, causing increased delinquencies across the subprime auto lending sector. To protect itself from this trend, Car-Mart responded by tightening underwriting standards to reduce default risk, even though fewer approved loans also meant fewer vehicle sales.

In 2022, Car-Mart expanded its use of asset-backed securitizations (ABS), packaging consumer auto loans into bonds sold to institutional investors. According to Bloomberg, doing so provided access to $2.5 billion in capital that allowed the company to acquire new dealerships and compete in new markets. But the use of ABS structures created strict cash-flow rules. Payments collected from borrowers were directed to debt service first, limiting the amount of cash available for operating the business. Car-Mart's 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission illustrates this prioritization—the company collected approximately $730 million from customers during fiscal 2026, a year-over-year increase of 2.2%, yet inventories, loan origination, and dealerships shrank.

Now operating under temporary lender waivers, Car-Mart is exploring options to avoid bankruptcy, including asset sales and debt restructuring.

Car-Mart's predicament may foreshadow refinancing challenges facing many leveraged companies as debt issued during the 2020–2021 era of near-zero interest rates matures and must be refinanced at today's substantially higher borrowing costs. Over $1 trillion in high-yield corporate debt will reach maturity between 2026 and 2027, warns management consultancy Teneo. Another subprime auto lender, Tricolor Holdings, preceded Car-Mart and declared bankruptcy along with an auto parts manufacturer, First Brands Group, in 2025 due to these pressures.