Maritime Safety

A commercial tugboat may represent an investment of tens of millions of dollars, supported by experienced crews whose decisions depend on vessel configuration, operating conditions, and practical knowledge. Yet, for smaller maritime businesses, regulatory administration can account for a substantial share of the work required to keep vessels compliant and available for service.

As federal oversight evolves, the challenge may increasingly involve aligning documentation, inspection practices, and professional judgment with the realities of commercial marine operations. The U.S. Coast Guard's implementation of Subchapter M, the federal framework governing towing vessels, offers a useful lens through which to examine how safety requirements can support operational reliability while accounting for differences in vessel size, function, and risk.

Bob Carey, executive director of The TUGTOW Association, a trade association representing tugboat, towboat, dredging, and other inshore maritime operators, brings a distinctive perspective to this discussion. A retired Navy officer with extensive experience in government, congressional affairs, and infrastructure policy, Carey supports rigorous safety standards and recognizes the importance of effective regulatory oversight.

His perspective also raises a consequential question. "How might compliance requirements better reflect actual safety outcomes? Procedures can provide essential safeguards, while their practical value may depend on how inspectors interpret them, how operators apply them, and whether professional judgment remains part of the process," Carey says. As his work with TUGTOW suggests, regulatory effectiveness may be strengthened when documented compliance and operational competence reinforce each other.

Carey's perspective draws on a broader institutional question of how regulators can maintain rigorous standards while developing the commercial expertise needed to apply them consistently. He notes that the Coast Guard brings extensive maritime knowledge and an essential public safety mission. However, its military personnel rotation system may present challenges for a commercial sector whose vessels, contracts, and operating practices require specialized familiarity.

"Civilian regulatory models, including those associated with the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration, offer useful points of reference for examining how long-term regional expertise could complement national standards," Carey suggests.

Personnel transitions may become particularly significant when inspectors encounter specialized vessel configurations or unfamiliar operating arrangements. A two-to-three-year assignment can provide valuable experience, while recurring rotations may make institutional knowledge harder to retain at individual ports.

The resulting variation in regulatory interpretation is a concern raised by TUGTOW, particularly regarding Subchapter M. An interpretation applied in New York Harbor may differ from one applied in Charleston, prompting operators to seek additional guidance as vessels move between jurisdictions. The Coast Guard's own Towing Vessel National Center of Expertise identifies consistent regulatory application as an organizational objective, supported through training, inspection guidance, and industry engagement. Its existing work offers a foundation for further alignment across regions.

The implications become clearer when an inspection affects a small fleet. "Consider a family-owned operator with three tugboats whose vessel is directed to undergo additional work or remain out of service while an unfamiliar technical configuration receives further review," Carey says. "Even when the underlying concern warrants examination, a prolonged dry-dock delay may affect scheduled contracts, crew assignments, shipyard availability, and revenue across the business."

Larger companies may have dedicated compliance teams to coordinate these demands, while smaller operators often distribute administrative responsibilities among personnel who also manage daily operations. For Carey, this difference in organizational capacity makes proportional enforcement an important consideration in maritime policy.

The structure of Subchapter M adds another dimension. Operators can use a Towing Safety Management System, which involves audits and surveys through an approved third-party organization, or pursue the Coast Guard inspection option. According to the Coast Guard's official guidance on third-party organizations, the TSMS route includes management and vessel audits, certification, and surveys intended to assess regulatory compliance. These processes can support safety management, although their cost and administrative requirements may weigh differently across companies.

A small towing business with a limited operating area and a specialized support vessel may have different compliance needs from a large fleet conducting complex, long-distance operations. TUGTOW advocates exploring proportionate requirements that account for such differences while preserving appropriate safeguards.

Technology adds further context to this discussion. Modern propulsion and monitoring systems may allow crews to observe engine performance and respond to certain conditions from the pilothouse. Depending on the equipment and applicable requirements, electronic diagnostics and remote monitoring may also support maintenance and operational decisions.

Carey suggests that inspection practices should evolve alongside verified technological capabilities, with requirements informed by equipment specifications, manufacturer guidance, and demonstrated safety performance. In June 2026, the Coast Guard published updated work instructions covering towing-vessel inspections under the TSMS option and third-party organization yet provides no equivalent standardized guidance for subchapter M inspection and enforcement. This introduces significant regulatory uncertainty for the operators subjected to this enforcement. These updates illustrate how the regulatory framework can be refined over time.

For Carey, TUGTOW's role is to bring the experiences of smaller inshore businesses into federal policy discussions. Its priorities include more consistent Subchapter M interpretation, appropriate oversight of third-party audits, practical scheduling provisions for dry-dock and structural examinations, and administrative requirements proportionate to operational risk. A civilian regulatory structure is one option Carey supports for strengthening commercial expertise and national consistency, alongside clearer guidance and accountable review processes within the existing framework, especially when developing the corporate memory among the inspectors of how this unique inshore maritime industry actually operates, and not simply trying to copy and paste the same procedures for the same big blue water operators.

The broader opportunity lies in developing a system where inspectors can apply common standards with a strong understanding of vessel-specific conditions. The very nature of the Coast Guard being a military service does not provide the inspectors with the longevity necessary to learn nuances of this industry. As Carey emphasizes, effective maritime safety depends on rigorous requirements, informed professional judgment, and procedures that reflect operational realities. For the businesses sustaining America's working waterfront, regulatory consistency may help preserve resources for the equipment, training, maintenance, and skilled personnel that support safe operations across the nation's waterways.