As the recent decision on COVID vaccine mandates for large employers reminds us, the Supreme Court, more than the White House or Congress, is running our country.

The nation's highest judicial body has, in fact, become so assertive as to impede predictable development of the law, thus undermining both economic advances and democratic norms. It regularly overpowers the presidential administration in office at any given time, as well as Congress. The court exploits the near paralysis of the latter, and the helplessness of the former, to prevent its policy decisions from being overturned whenever the justices disagree.

There are many problems with this status quo.

First, the court lacks accountability to the voters, which instills discipline and democratic legitimacy in the other two branches. But that seems not to bother the justices. Although unelected, justices routinely override considered decisions of the two elected branches and establish broad national policy on many controversial issues facing our society.

In earlier eras, the court was more respectful of policy choices of the Executive and Congress. Justices then seemed more accepting of the civics class notion that, with limited exceptions, Congress made the laws, the courts applied the laws, and the Executive enforced the laws. Apparently, no more.

Many of the justices sound more political, ideological, and driven by personal agendas. And, more openly, even brazenly, so.

Whether the issue is state limitations on constitutional abortion rights, COVID vaccine mandates for large employers, voting rights in federal elections, or any number of other controversies, the court seems quite prepared to impose its will on the entire nation of 330 million people. Or, at least, the will of five of the nine justices.

No wonder many commentators call for institutional reforms, including term limits, age limits, expanding the court's size, and more.

Its processes are as inadequate for policymaking as its intrusions on the elected branches are inappropriate. Consider their lack of deep involvement or expertise in the complex subjects before them.

Decisions that may have been carefully crafted, often over years, by hundreds of legislators or scores of administration experts can be suddenly upended by five brilliant, but fallible, humans in black robes -- all after a single set of legal briefs by interested parties and an oral argument lasting only one hour. Nor are any "amicus briefs" really by neutral "friends of the court." Rather, like the parties' briefs, they nearly always represent special pleading by people advancing selfish interests. And, the justice's aides are young clerks barely out of law school.

By contrast, the Legislature and Executive are composed of mature political leaders who often spent years studying an issue, gaining input from hundreds of experts and diverse arrays of stakeholders. And then acting only after conducting many hearings or innumerable meetings. Their processes may not be perfect, but they surely look more complete than the court's.

Having worked in all three branches as a lawyer in the Justice Department and a Watergate prosecutor, in the Senate with the Intelligence Committee and the late Arlen Specter, and as a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, I am sensitive to the limited roles of each. In my view, the high court has been going beyond its proper bounds.

In addition to being the wrong policymaker, its policy revisions are often harmful.

One example: in the ongoing COVID crisis, the nation suffers from a massive shortage of diagnostic tests. How that happened is no mystery. In 2012, the court abruptly ruled that all diagnostic methods were ineligible for patenting. Until then, they were eligible. The effect was to destroy much of the diagnostics industry and convince many of our remaining biotech companies to abandon this field.

Other such examples exist; nor are they limited to the field of science and patent law. And, in this specific instance, the court directly re-wrote the patent statute as enacted by Congress and unchanged for 200 years. The Patent Act explicitly permits, without any exceptions, patents for methods.

As a retired judge, I recognize the justices' duty to decide cases before them. They nevertheless need to avoid imposing on the nation their own personal opinions on controversial public issues.

With a few exceptions specified in the Constitution, public policy is for Congress and the executive, not the justices, to fashion.

Failing the court's conversion to greater self-restraint and to avoiding politics and ideology, Congress should weigh all options, then select the best to compel the court simply to decide cases, not mandate basic policies for the nation.

Paul R. Michel served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for 22 years, and as its chief judge from 2004 until his retirement in 2010.